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CCC is the research arm of the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
Like all major disasters, natural or manmade, the terrorist attacks of September 11 resulted in a tragic 
loss of life and destruction of property, as well as short-term disruption of economic activity. In addition, 
because of the size and premeditated nature of the attack, there are likely to be more lasting effects in 
some industries and segments of the U.S. economy.  
Conceptually, the economic costs to the United States stemming from the 9/11 terrorist attacks can be 
broken down into several categories, largely depending on their nature (direct and indirect) and on the 
time period examined (immediate, short-term, medium-term and long-term). Those costs that are short 
run and direct are clearly the easiest to identify and measure. Estimates covering longer periods of time 
and focused mainly on indirect costs require numerous assumptions concerning counterfactuals and 
hence are on less firm ground. Another area of controversy involves the anthrax scare following the 
attacks. The estimates below treat this as a separate event, although in some of the indirect cost 
estimates this factor may have had an influence. 
Immediate and Short Term Direct Impacts 
The September 11 attacks inflicted casualties and material damages on a far greater scale than any other 
terrorist aggression in recent history. Lower Manhattan lost approximately 30 percent of its office space 
and a number of businesses ceased to exist. Close to 200,000 jobs were destroyed or relocated out of 
New York City, at least temporarily. The destruction of physical assets was estimated in the national 
accounts to amount to $14 billion for private businesses, $1.5 billion for state and local government 
enterprises and $0.7 billion for federal enterprises. Rescue, cleanup and related costs have been 
estimated to amount to at least $11 billion for a total direct cost of $27.2 billion.  
Immediate and Short Term Indirect Impacts 
Immediately after the attacks, leading forecast services sharply revised downward their projections of 
economic activity. The consensus forecast for U.S. real GDP growth was instantly downgraded by 0.5 
percentage points for 2001 and 1.2 percentage points for 2002. The implied projected cumulative loss in 
national income through the end of 2003 amounted to 5 percentage points of annual GDP, or half a trillion 
dollars.  
With production disrupted in some areas (airlines) and consumers increasingly cautious, real GDP shrank 
in the third quarter of 2001. But in the fourth quarter, demand held up better than initially feared, and GDP 
increased. However, private sector fixed investment registered a steep decline, and inventories were 
slashed. Offsetting these forces, however, were household consumption, helped by falling energy prices, 
and government spending. Defense spending in particular grew by about 9.25% in real terms in the fourth 
quarter, at a seasonally adjusted annual rate. 
Some sectors or firms actually witnessed an increase in demand, notably in the area of security and 
information technology. Still, while overall demand proved fairly resilient, a number of sectors were hit 
hard, with declining output and profits continuing into the mid-term.  
Overall however the short-term adverse economic impact of the attacks was far less than feared initially, 
thanks in large part to good economic crisis management. The Federal Reserve, the Administration and 
Congress acted quickly to restore confidence, inject liquidity and provide resources to deal with the 
consequences of the attacks. The Federal Reserve by lowering the price of credit and temporarily 
providing vast amounts of liquidity helped safeguard the integrity of the financial system and saved many 
firms from bankruptcy. 
Medium Term Impacts 
Looking beyond the short term, the fact that the attack was premeditated and therefore could be repeated 
has had a significant impact on five main areas: (1) insurance; (2) airlines; (3) tourism and other industries 
associated with travel; (4) shipping; and (5) increased defense/security expenditures. In turn, 
developments in these areas have had a broader effect on wide areas of economic activity. 
• Insurance. The losses from the terrorist attacks for the insurance industry (including reinsurance) 
are estimated at between $30 and $58 billion with the main uncertainty concerning liability 
insurance. By comparison the losses associated with Hurricane Andrew's 1992 damage in Florida 
came to around $21 billion. Even if the final cost is close to the lower estimate, insured losses in 
2001 are likely to have been the highest ever.  
Following the attacks, most primary insurers have increased their premiums and curtailed or 
dropped altogether coverage for terrorism-related risk. The increases in insurance premiums 
have adversely affected several key industries. The strongest impact has been on aviation, but 
other sectors, including transportation, construction, and tourism and energy generation have 
also been affected. Overall it is estimated that commercial property and liability insurance rates 
have been raised by 30 percent on average.  
• Airlines. The United States' airline industry was already in a weak financial position before the 
attacks with rising debt ratios and falling returns on investment. Even with cutbacks in service of 
the order of 20 percent and significant government support, airline passenger traffic has 
apparently remained below normal, 100,000 layoffs have been announced and employment in 
October and November fell by 81,000 (almost 8 percent). Equity valuations compared to the 
overall market illustrate these difficulties. The U.S. airline sector has lost around 20 percent of its 
relative value since September 10.  
• Tourism and Other Service Industries. Other industries have also been badly affected, such as 
hotels, tourism, automobile rentals, travel agents, and civilian aircraft manufactures. For example, 
hotels have reported higher vacancy rates and employment in the sector as a whole fell by 
58,000 (about 3 percent) in October and November. Relative equity values for hotels and leisure 
facilities are off by around 15 percent.  
• Shipping. Shipping is an area where it is particularly hard to assess the impact of the terrorist 
attacks. The main problem is one of defining a credible counterfactual—i.e., what would the state 
of affairs been in the absence of 9/11? For example, in spite of new security requirements, six 
months following the attacks most available indices showed little evidence of an increase in 
shipping costs. Some rates had even declined. Maritime shipping rates increased by 5 to 10 
percent on average in the two weeks following the attack, but that rise was soon reversed. 
Airfreight rates, on the other hand were bout 10 percent higher in late 2001 than before the 
attacks. Given the sharp deceleration of aggregate demand beginning in 2000 and the drop in 
fuel costs following the attacks, a steeper decline in freight costs should have occurred. The 
relative stability of freight rates, despite lower fuel costs and under-utilized shipping capacity 
would tend to suggest that underlying transportation costs may have increased as a result of the 
9/11 attacks.  
• Increases in security and military spending. The President has requested a significant increase in 
security-related programs in the context of the budget for FY2003. Additional spending of $48 
billion was proposed for national defense (an increase of 14 percent from the previous year). In 
addition the President asked Congress for an appropriation of $38 billion for homeland security, 
compared to $20 billion spent in 2001. This seeks to improve the preparedness of first 
responders (fireman, police, and rescue workers), enhance defenses against biological attacks, 
secure borders and improve information sharing and includes $8 billion for domestic defense 
spending.  
While it is too early to say with any precision, the medium term costs to the economy may be 
considerable. The shrinkage of terrorism related insurance coverage may have a detrimental impact on 
investment as lenders become wary of greater potential risks, although there is no strong evidence yet of 
such a pattern. While providing a much needed short-run stimulus to the economy, the increased levels of 
fiscal deficits stemming from the acceleration in defense expenditures may, in the medium-to-longer term, 
retard growth by increasing interest rates and thus reducing private capital formation and productivity.  
Long Term Impacts 
The main channel though which the continual threat of terrorism could affect the long term potential of the 
global economy is by raising transactions costs, resulting in a reduction in potential output. These costs 
can be broken down as follows: 
• Higher operating costs. Businesses may experience higher operating costs owing to increased 
spending on security, higher insurance premiums and longer wait times for activities.  
• Higher levels of inventories. Business may be required to hold larger inventories than previously, 
owing in part to less reliable air and rail transportation. There is anecdotal evidence from the auto 
industry that production was interrupted because components were not immediately available 
from suppliers after the September 11 attacks, owing to delays in shipments crossing the U.S.-
Canada border.  
• Higher risk premium. As a result of the attack, lenders' appetite for risk may decline, leading to 
higher risk premiums that may be passed on to businesses in the form of higher interest rates 
and lower equity prices, with an adverse effect on business investment, and a smaller capital 
stock.  
• Shift of resources away from the civilian labor force toward the military. More resources may be 
diverted toward the military for use in the containment of terrorism. In addition, research and 
development (R&D) resources may be shifted way from productive activities towards the 
development of new devices to thwart terrorism (although such devices may have beneficial 
spillover effects elsewhere).  
• Shift away from globalization. The attack may have effects on firms' investment decisions—in 
particular whether to invest domestically or abroad, in part because of potential disruption of 
cross-border flows of goods and assets. Costs for such transactions may rise owing to closer 
inspection of transactions and higher insurance premiums  
While the immediate and short run impacts of the terrorist attacks were shown to be considerable, 
medium to longer term impacts are much more problematical. The Congressional Joint Economic 
Committee has compiled a comprehensive set of forecasts of the costs of terrorism. These studies vary 
based on assumptions about two key issues. The first is the extent to which transaction costs will 
increase—an issue that depends heavily upon whether further attacks occur, forcing high levels of 
constant vigilance, or whether September 11 turns out to be a relatively isolated incident, implying a 
smaller long-term change in behavior. The second is the degree to which any increase in transaction 
costs will disrupt economic activity.  
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our Homeland Security & Terrorism Resources. 
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